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FORMALLY OR INFORMALLY, four key sets of questions shape the manner in which those in the national security policy arena evaluate an 
issue fraught with legal implications: (1) what is the settled policy of the United 
States; (2) what specific interests are at stake, and what are the objective 
outcomes we seek; (3) what are the requirements of the contemporary 
international legal regime, and what concrete obligations has the United States 
undertaken; and (4) what is the nature and direction of the international 
system or environment. It is through the evaluation of the dynamic interaction 
, of these factors that one determines the course of action. Law is no simple 
application of norm to situation, but a rigorous interpretation of both. 
The key variable in future years will be the changing nature of the 
international system, including not only the general configuration of power 
but the technology of conflict. Policy makers and pundits alike are seeking 
both to define and to influence the characteristics of that environment 
within which the legal regime will evolve and which ~ill in turn be shaped by 
the law. 
The Changing International Order 
It is worth noting in the first place that the United States is entering into 
"normal" times. The United States emerged as a great power in the late 
nineteenth century at the very moment when the relatively stable balances of 
the preceding period were giving way to titanic struggles over the mastery of 
Europe and Asia. America was about to be swept up in the vortex of universal 
history. 
However brutal yet tawdry the drama would be, the twentieth century 
would be no opera comique or afternoon "soap." Many of the actors would be 
heroic and even the petty villains endowed with a wickedness to inspire a 
Dante or a Milton. The issues would be primordial and the stakes mortal. It 
would be a polarizing century. How fatuous it would be to ask in 1918, 1940, 
1960, or 1980, though some, alas, in fact did, who the enemy was or what the 
contest was all about. 
Now, after the heroic struggles of the twentieth century, the United States is 
seeking to understand and to play its role as a great power without a great 
quarrel. And we may discover that it is not peace that is enervating for military 
forces; it is a diffusion of the threats, uncertainty of the stakes, and ambiguity in 
the response. Such an era has dangers ultimately as deadly as the protean 
struggle of the giants, for the lines we must defend are not clearly marked and 
the perilous consequences of error and weakness less immediately apparent. 
Even the polarizing clashes of the twentieth century had moments of 
deceleration and of lassitude. Winston Churchill, writing of the aftermath of 
World War I, observed: 
To the faithful, toil-burdened masses the victory was so complete that no further 
effort seemed required. Germany had fallen and with her the world combination 
that had crushed her. Authority was dispersed; the world unshackled; the weak 
became the strong; the sheltered became the aggressive; the contrast between 
victors and vanquished tended continually to diminish. A vast fatigue 
dominated collective action. Though every subversive element endeavored to 
assert itself, revolutionary rage like every other form of psychic energy burnt low. 
Through all its five acts the drama had run its course; the light of history is 
switched off, the world stage dims, the actors shrivel, the chorus sinks. The war of 
the giants has ended; the quarrels of the pygmies have begun. l 
That same Winston Churchill believed that the devastation of the Second 
World War stemmed from the inability of the great democracies in the 
aftermath of that first Great War to manage the quarrels of the pygmies and the 
demands of the ordinary. As he again wrote, this time in the commencement of 
his study of World War II: 
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It is my purpose ... to show how easily the tragedy of the Second World War 
could have been prevented; how the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the 
weakness of the virtuous; how the structure and habits of democratic states, 
unless they are wielded into larger organisms, lack those elements of persistence 
and conviction which can alone give security to humble masses; how, even in 
matters of self preservation, no policy is pursued for even ten or fifteen years at a 
time. \Y/ e shall see how the counsels of prudence and restraint may become the 
prime agents of mortal danger; how the middle course adopted from desires for 
safety and a quiet life may be found to lead directly to the bull's-eye of disaster. 
We shall see how absolute is the need of a broad path of international action 
pursued by many states in common across the years irrespective of the ebb and 
flow of national politics.2 
What, then, are the requisites of a great power in ordinary times? What do 
the people need from those who will stand guard over the animating values and 
concrete interests of the nation? 
First, true leadership must retain a sense of those permanent values and 
interests that define and animate this remarkable democratic republic. And 
second, it must grasp, if only intuitively and "through a glass darkly," the 
changes that are moving us beyond the contours of international power in the 
twentieth century into the configuration of power and influence and the focus 
of competition and cooperation in the twenty-first century. "The future," as 
Yogi Berra observed, "isn't what it used to be." 
Throughout the course of this century, two great systemic gulfs have 
opened. First, a disjuncture between social and political boundaries, and 
second, a chasm between the aspirations of our peoples and the competence of 
our governments. The two are probably related. This disjuncture between 
social and political boundaries is described in many ways-globalization of the 
economy, clash of civilizations, tribalization, global environmentalism, 
information revolutions, the universal reach of weapons, persistent mass 
migrations, and so forth. In effect, many important social activities transcend 
traditional territorial boundaries. This in itself is not bad and in many areas is a 
positive good. The difficulty stems from the fact that not only are many of these 
activities unregulated by political norms and legal understandings, but they are 
connected with no particular community and hence animated by no sense of 
the common good. This disconnect is particularly troublesome to the various 
governments around the world, because their peoples do hold those individual 
regimes responsible for the general welfare, the elements of which they 
sometimes have only tenuous control. In addition to all the historical 
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possibilities open to demagoguery, ambition, and avarice, these disjunctures 
provide even more opportunity for mischief. 
Hence, the great issue of the early twenty,first century is likely to be that of 
political organization: how power and authority will be shared within, between, 
and across states and how individual liberty and collective action will be 
reconciled; what mechanisms will be developed on how and to what degree the 
growth in the general storehouse of wealth will be distributed; what norms will 
legitimize the exercise of power within and without; and what constraints will 
be expected and enforced. 
A moral vision and a political and economic formula will be critical to the 
architecture of the new century, but without a foundation of security, the 
house will not withstand the inevitable vicissitudes of economic downturn, 
political ineptitude, and personal ambition. There will be at least three key 
ingredients of that foundation which will affect how we think about general 
norms of international law and the laws of armed conflict. They are: 
First, a solid structure of deterrence and reassurance: to protect the sinews, 
even in the new era, of our political independence and territorial integrity and 
to guard against the undue concentration of international power; 
. Second, a modicum of international public order: to establish or renew 
limited but real norms of international behavior and to be prepared, as 
circumstance dictates and allows, to enforce those norms through independent 
and collective coercive action; and 
Third, a residual capacity to apply military organization to relieve, where 
appropriate, human suffering. 
What are the implications for international law in general and military 
operational law in particular of this new world and the required security 
system? Such a question raises both the possibilities and the limitations of any 
legal code. Law reflects social values and interests and provides predictable 
norms in terms of which both group and individual decisions are made. In 
simple terms, law, to be effective or legitimate, must embody a shared concept 
of justice and a promise of public order, that is, the minimization of 
arbitrariness reflected in widespread violence and random social behavior. 
Every legal system constitutes rules for human behavior, not physical or 
biological rules of human behavior. Hence, even if reflective of the interests 
and values of the community, there is always a gap between the legal norm and 
social behavior. The issue for the legitimacy and continuity of the legal system 
is whether or not the gap is so great as to constitute a scandal, an irrelevance, a 
danger, or all of the above. 
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A central issue in any political, legal order is why one should obey at all. 
Typically the answer is three,fold: 
First, the appeal to conscience. This raises such concerns as, is the regime 
"good," is the social arrangement "proper," and does the political order sustain 
the "good life"? 
Second, calculations of interest. Important here is the balance between the 
immediate possession of "goods" (short term), on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, the continuous protection of or access to those goods by virtue of 
the social arrangements (long term). 
Third, coercion. This involves not simply brute strength but the ability of a 
political regime to invoke obligations arising from a coordinated perspective of 
what constitutes collective values, goods, actions and a willingness on the part 
of the subjects of that regime to entrust to it the authority and the power to 
reconcile divergent claims and enforce compliance. 
Politics is hence not simply consensus but implies enforcement of communal 
norms, i.e., coercion. Cicero described the political order as an agreement in 
justice. This specifically entails the joining of rights to duties within the 
framework of an agreed vision of the common good. Many social communities 
are primarily voluntary in character with little or no coercive core, and some 
have argued that the broader political community may be likewise. Indeed, this 
latter view is the basis of social utopian schemes, and undergirded Marx's 
notion of the withering away of the State, ironical in view of the Soviet 
totalitarian experience. Nonetheless, the key problem of what Aristotle would 
have called a constitutional regime is to define the relationship between 
consent and coercion. 
The coercive aspect of politics has three basic elements: 
a. The legitimization of coercion-the political order is necessarily a 
moral order. It was by design that Aristotle's study of ethics and of politics were 
considered of a piece; 
b. The complex organization of coercion; and 
c. The regularization and limitation of coercion, i.e., lawful force. 
In the most stable political communities, persistent coercion is not normal and 
tends to be distant in the life of the ordinary citizen. This may be true of both 
domestic and of international politics; for instance, on the domestic side, 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Switzerland, and, tn the international side, 
u.S.,Canadian relations or the European Union. 
The "scandal" of the international political,le al system has, of course, 
always been endemic violence, even to the poin, of jeopardizing the very 
integrity or independence, sometimes existence, of the member States. As has 
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been often noted, this state' of affairs stems in the first instance from the 
anarchic character of international affairs: there is no universally accepted or 
effective keeper of the "ultima ratio," the exclusive right of enforcement. 
Exacerbating this structural problem is the heterogeneity of political systems, 
with its differing conceptions oflaw, and the periodic disruptions associated 
with messianic or imperial visions. 
Recall the two systemic disjunctures mentioned earlier-the increasing gap 
between social and political boundaries and the concomitant distance between 
the aspirations of the citizenry and the ability of government to meet those 
aspirations. In addition to the normal tensions which anarchy, ambition, and 
political heterogeneity introduce to the international legal regime, the 
denationalization and globalization of many economies and the increasing 
social tribalization within and across national boundaries have further 
complicated all the key elements of both domestic and international law 
enforcement. 
In a sense we are building a "new international order" while seeking to cope 
with the old international order! We hear talk about the demise of the nation 
state and the declining utility of force whilst such states seem quite lively and 
prone, along with "non~state" actors, to use force on a regular basis. The 
contradictions may only be apparent. As noted above, there is always a gap 
between legal norm and social behavior. So too, human beings are always 
creating new forms of activity that transcend current legal institutions and 
political authOrity. In time, such activity has such impact on other individuals 
and groups that improvements in political and legal institutional competencies 
or new forms of cooperation and control are sought. States, alliances and 
coalitions, international organizations are not dying but being recast. In the 
security realm this has certain immediate implications. 
One often hears American public officials, military officers, and 
political~military commentators speak of the importance of "stability" as an 
object of U.S. security policy. Assuming this is not simply a code word for the 
status quo and no change, it probably refers to a degree of security and 
satisfaction as well as the availability of means of peaceful change among 
peoples that is sufficient to minimize violence and reinforce a political order 
widely accepted as legitimate. In effect, even as we seek to realize our 
immediate interests, we need to do so in such a way as to reinforce existing 
standards or to develop new norms of international behavior and to employ our 
power unilaterally or in association with other states to "incentivize" 
adherence to such norms. 
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Earlier, three key elements of a security foundation were mentioned-a 
structure of deterrence and reassurance, a modicum of public order, and a 
capacity to alleviate human suffering. In concrete terms, these broad objectives 
translate in the first instance into political associations that join in predictable 
ways u.s. diplomatic, economic, and military power with that of a number of 
great powers. In this regard, some of the key diplomatic, economic, and military 
cooperative mechanisms developed after World War II are still relevant-such 
as NATO, the World Bank, the IMF, the American,Japanese alignment, the 
UN, and more recent innovations such as the World Trade Organization, the 
North American Free Trade Association, new connections being forged with 
Russia and China and others. If deterrence and reassurance are to be 
structural, they must be anchored in normative understandings and articulated 
in institutional mechanisms. In effect, structural deterrence is grounded in 
collective legitimization. It cannot be sustained by American power alone, 
though U.S. military predominance and economic preeminence are probably 
key preconditions, nor can it endure by unilateral or ad hoc responses. 
If multilateralism is a key element of a deterrence and reassurance structure, 
it is equally so of the "routine" business of maintaining international public 
order. The control of transnational flows, many incident to globalization and 
driven by information and transportation technology, may require an 
unprecedented coordination of international efforts. Whether it be population 
movements, illegal commerce, or financial transactions, the development of 
rules, institutions, and cooperative procedures will become increasingly 
urgent. Constraints on the development, manufacture, and use of weapons 
of mass destruction will require a higher degree of consensus-both on the 
nature of the constraints and the means to enforce them-than currently 
exist. Witness the fragmented approach to Iraq. The same holds true for the 
general issue of terrorism. The definition and maintenance of international 
boundaries-whether they be territorial, diplomatic, economic, or 
military-will be at the heart of the agenda of re,articulating political 
organization in the twenty' first century. 
Humanitarian assistance has become an important, if still inchoate, 
commitment of the member States of the United Nations. When such aid 
requires the commitment of coercive force, the line between humanitarian and 
political intervention becomes very fine indeed. It is difficult here too to see 
how such activity can be long sustained without a multilateral framework and 
collective legitimization. 
In a real sense the international legal principles associated with the 1648 
Treaty of Westphalia-political independence, territorial integrity, legal 
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sovereignty, and domestic jurisdiction-were a response to the emergence of 
independent states and provided the foundation for the international public 
order even to the present. Interdependence was not in 1648 nor in 1998 
contradictory to these principles. Indeed, it was the fact that the emerging 
states of Europe were interdependent, often in a deadly way that impelled the 
princes of Europe to define guidelines for that interdependence. The issue of 
the emergent international order is not the interdependence of states but the 
globalization of economies and the transnational character of social 
movements. And, to a substantial degree, this transnational interlinkage is the 
end product of a particular political, economic philosophy, liberal economics, 
and the policy of an identifiable power, the United States. 
The persistent, if not always consistent, exercise of American power since 
World War II for international economic liberalization provided the essential 
matrix for the substantial denationalization of the advanced industrial 
economies and the remarkably free movement of peoples, goods, services, and 
capital across national boundaries. The permeability of state frontiers has been 
hastened by the nuclear, information, communication, and transportation 
revolutions. But none of these technological innovations would have been 
sufficient to transform the state system as thoroughly as has the political model 
of liberal economics. Neither Adam Smith nor John Locke would have been 
surprised. 
The essence of this model as embraced by the United States is the concept 
that state power should be so delimited as to allow a wide sphere for private 
choice and activities, including across national boundaries. At the same time, 
in theory and practice, the United States rejected the Bodinian concept that 
sovereignty cannot be divided but instead acted as if sovereignty could be 
dispersed and functionally, based. Coupled with the notions of natural, 
individual rights and of obligations transcendent of particular group (e.g., 
racial, ethnic, familial, religious, etc.) identifications-in effect, human rights 
and the rule of law-this philosophy of limited government and divided 
sovereignty became a powerful tool in the shaping of world politics. What is 
remarkable is that at almost any point from the end of the nineteenth century 
until very recently, one could as well have projected a wholly different 
vision-one of statism, nationalism, and autarky. As we approach the next 
century, however, it is clear that the liberal model reinforced by critical 
technological changes has decisively altered key elements of the international 
system. Social tribalization could ultimately trump this global society and 
reintroduce once again new forms of nationalism and statism, but it is not clear 
why the United States would favor such a return. 
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The implications of this line of reasoning should be clear: u.s. policy should 
be aimed at developing and sustaining universal norms that maintain open 
societies. This requires not only the removal of barriers to private social 
transactions, including commerce, across national boundaries but the creation 
and enforcement of rules for those activities that meet the expectations of our 
publics for justice and equity. This will require not only that many of the 
classical norms of the Westphalian order pertaining to the threat and use of 
force be upheld, but that norms relevant to a globalized system be defined and 
strengthened. This points to rules governing international commerce and what 
can only be seen as constabulary functions. The latter includes peace 
operations and arms control. 
To be precise on the last point, whether it be a policy related to the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or to the restoration of order in 
Haiti or the enforcement of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia, all entail an 
intervention into areas which used to be seen as falling within the sovereign 
jurisdiction of states. Unilateralism in these areas can only be seen as violations 
both of older concepts of international law and destructive of the development 
of norms adequate for societies that are increasingly interpenetrable. 
To put a finer point on it, there are growing expectations concerning not 
only the external but as well the internal behavior of states and their citizens. 
Certain standards of government behavior vis,8.,vis one's own citizens, 
presumed obligations concerning the development and manufacture of 
specified weapons systems, commerce in various items such as narcotics, 
decisions on trading partners, genocidal activities involving not only 
governments but parties to an internal conflict, the degree and character of 
public order, and comparable issues are increasingly being presented as raising 
questions of international law. And collective and individual state actions are 
being taken under this guise. The issue, in effect, is intervention within areas 
that historically have been thought as subject to domestic jurisdiction. 
Without a fairly specific set of agreed international rules in these areas and 
acceptable mechanisms to enforce them, there is a grave danger that states, 
and perhaps even non, state groups, will seek to legitimize unilateral 
intervention in behalf of parochial state interests by reference to presumed 
international standards. Ancient ambitions and modem globalization of our 
societies invite this abuse. Both the older order of Westphalia and the newer 
order generated by economic liberalization and contemporary technologies will 
fall victim-with consequent cascading disorder. 
While unilateral capabilities and actions will remain a key element in a still 
fragmented international system, and while such capabilities are probably 
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crucial for the United States to play the role of coalition builder and, yes, global 
constable, it is important that those capabilities be employed in such a way as to 
be norm-creating or reinforcing, that is, to yield an international system that is 
held in balance less by brute force and narrow calculations of interest than by, 
again harking back to Cicero, an agreement in justice. Both the nature of U.S. 
interests and the costs of unilateralism dictate that American power be 
oriented not only toward specific goods but toward the creation of a political 
and legal regime that will command the assent of a large number of the great 
and lesser powers. In effect, U.S. policy makers must exhibit a persistent and 
sophisticated understanding of the process of collective legitimization. 
In all this there is no area where all the elements of the security foundation 
will come together more clearly than in operational law, which crystallizes 
theory into practice in the development and application of rules of engagement 
(ROE). The Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law of 
Naval Operations defines ROE thusly: "During wartime or other periods of 
armed conflict, U.S. rules of engagement reaffirm the right and responsibility of 
the operational commander generally to seek out, engage, and destroy enemy 
forces consistent with national objectives, strategy, and the law of armed 
conflict." It further speaks of Standing Rules of Engagement approved by the 
National Command Authorities that delineate "the circumstances under 
which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue engagement with other forces 
encountered." 
In a critical way, practice appears to be expanding this narrow definition of 
ROE to cover all sorts of activities, including those not normally associated 
with "periods of armed conflict," such as humanitarian intervention, and to be 
aimed not only at the control of U.S. forces but coalitional forces as well. The 
scope of peacetime rules of engagement and the practical meaning of the 
Standing Rules of Engagement are being progressively expanded. These norms 
have provided the foundation not only for instruction to American officers but 
to foreign officers around the world. 
In a recent international simulation sponsored in Europe by the Naval War 
College, it became evident to the members of that distinguished foreign 
audience that abstract commitment to cooperate never has the clarity to affect 
events unless tied to rules by which armed forces would join and collaborate. 
Scholars of international politics and law will explicate the changing 
requirements of international security, and statesmen will forge general 
agreements. It is in the area of operational law, however, that the true 
dimensions of these requirements and agreements will be revealed. 
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Jean Girandoux, in a statement not meant to be complimentary, once wrote 
that international law is "the most powerful training ground for the 
imagination." And in a real sense it is and should be. If vast social forces are 
transforming the international system, and if, as I have contended, the great 
issue of the twenty,first century will be that of political organization, both of 
states and the community of states, then we are in a period in which the legal 
imagination must be pressed into service. This will require a re,articulation of 
the general principles of international law and the extension of the scope and 
depth of operational law in the national security arena. Such an evolution is 
critical not only for a relatively stable international order but is likely to be 
fundamental to the role of the United States as a great regulatory and 
constitutive power. Both the short, term and long,term interests of the 
Republic are bound to the political imagination and will of those American 
leaders entrusted with the defense of those interests in a time when, in the 
words of Alfred Lord Tennyson, "the old order passeth away. The new is 
struggling to be born." 
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